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Broadcast 
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F
or 25 years, public key cryptography has
reigned supreme as the foundation of secure
systems. Recently, however, advances in a
new cryptographic area, broadcast encryp-
tion, threaten to unseat this technology in
certain applications. Amos Fiat and Moni Naor
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spawned this new technique when they published
a seminal paper in 1993 addressing the following
question: “Can two devices, previously unknown
to each other, agree upon a key if they only have a
one-way communication path?” They can indeed,
and the one-way nature of this communication
gives broadcast encryption its name.
The conditional access application motivated Fiat
and Naor’s work. This technology restricts access to
a TV cable system’s premium channels to viewers
who have paid a subscription fee. Ironically, this
ﬂagship application for broadcast encryption has
proven less important than another application—
media content protection. This application has the
same one-way nature as an encrypted broadcast: A
recorder makes an encrypted recording and, years
later, a player that might not even have existed when
the recording was made needs to play it back. This
situation allows no opportunity for the player and
recorder to communicate a cryptographic key.
To commercialize broadcast encryption for media
content protection, IBM, Intel, Matsushita, and
Toshiba founded the 4C Entity, LLC in 1998 and
developed the Content Protection for Recordable
Media technology. Devices that use CPRM have
already been marketed, including DVD audio play-
ers, DVD video recorders, and some ﬂash memory
music players—speciﬁcally, those that use Secure
Digital Memory Card or Secure CompactFlash.
The content protection scheme for DVD video
predated Brendan Traw’s insight that broadcast
encryption could be applied to protect media.
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Instead, DVD video uses the Content Scrambling
System, a shared-secret scheme. According to a
story that’s at least 50 percent apocryphal, a 16-
year-old in Norway found the shared secret and
thus broke CSS in 1999.
Regardless of the actual facts, the CSS scheme has
been broken, and it is now easy to ﬁnd programs on
the Internet that will decrypt a DVD protected by
CSS. Thus, short of redesigning the system from
scratch, the CSS security break cannot be ﬁxed. Had
the scheme been based on broadcast encryption, on
the other hand, developers could have issued new
discs that would exclude those circumvention pro-
grams without affecting legitimate consumer devices.
Our work focuses on various aspects of content
protection, which we believe is the ideal application
for broadcast encryption. However, some applica-
tions match badly with broadcast encryption,
thereby revealing weaknesses of this technology.
HOW BROADCAST ENCRYPTION WORKS
There are at least four different schemes for
broadcast encryption, and all share some common
features. These schemes are based on a key man-
agement block: a block of data that is sent at the
beginning of a broadcast in a broadcast application
or is prerecorded on blank media during the man-
ufacturing process. Each recipient reads the key
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management block and processes it to yield a man-
agement key. Each device processes this key man-
agement block in a slightly different way, but they
all get the same ﬁnal answer. On the other hand,
when circumvention devices attempt to process the
key management block in the same way, they end
up with the wrong answer. 
At this point, the different broadcast encryption
schemes diverge. Content protection for recordable
media, the simplest and easiest to explain, associ-
ates the key management block with a matrix of
device keys. The CPRM matrix is always much
taller than it is wide. For example, a recordable
DVD’s matrix measures 16 columns wide by
roughly 2,500 rows tall, and it is pre-embossed onto
the disk’s lead-in area. The key management block
is the repeated encryption of the management key
using each different device key. A consumer elec-
tronics device that knows a device key’s position in
the matrix can decrypt the value found at that posi-
tion. The result will be the management key.
Each device actually has 16 device keys, one for
each column in the matrix. Figure 1 shows these
keys as rectangles in the matrix. Every device in the
world has a different set of device keys. If we pick
two devices at random, they might have one or two
keys in common, but no two devices will have all
16 keys in common. To process the key manage-
ment block, a device uses one of its keys to decrypt
the corresponding position in the matrix.
Which device key? At ﬁrst, it doesn’t matter—any
column will do. But once the system comes under
attack, circumvention devices will appear that are
using some of the keys in the matrix. Figure 1 shows
compromised keys as Xs. If an innocent device ﬁnds
that one of its keys has been crossed out, it simply
moves on to another column. Eventually, it will ﬁnd
a key that has not been compromised. In severe
cases, the system may be so compromised that most
of the matrix has Xs. In that case, the system would
exclude some innocent devices, and we would prob-
ably say that the system has been broken.
Thus, the CPRM scheme has a ﬁnite, albeit large,
capability to withstand attack, as was also true of
the original Fiat-Naor scheme. In 1998, however,
two independent groups—one led by Debby
Wallner
3 and another led by Chung Kei Wong
4—
found a scheme that had unlimited revocation. The
Wallner-Wong scheme, which uses trees of keys
instead of a matrix, is called the logical key hierar-
chy. Unfortunately, because the LKH key manage-
ment block for a given amount of revocation
capability was about the same size as a matrix-
based key management block, LKH did not offer
any improvement for media. 
In 2000, however, Dalit Naor and colleagues
5
developed an LKH approach that substantially
reduced the size of the key management block to
roughly the size of a public-key certiﬁcate revoca-
tion list. That improvement eliminated a remain-
ing advantage of public key cryptography.
BROADCAST ENCRYPTION VERSUS PUBLIC KEY
Broadcast encryption is fast. All its calculations
are done using simple symmetric encryptions. In
contrast, actual public key calculations require
exponentiation operations over a ﬁnite ﬁeld. The
processor load to calculate a management key in a
broadcast encryption scheme literally requires less
than 1,000 times the load required to perform a
public key signature calculation.
Certificate revocation lists are a vital if often
overlooked aspect of public key systems. Without
a means to revoke compromised individual keys, a
public key system degenerates into a global secret
scheme: The ﬁrst break defeats the entire system.
If a proposed public key system contains a ﬂaw—
and, sadly, many do these days—it is almost
axiomatic that the revocation information fails to
travel through the system.
Granted, broadcast encryption schemes are as
sensitive as public key schemes to proper revoca-
tion. However, in a broadcast encryption scheme,
it is difﬁcult to forget about the problem: The revo-
cation information is implicit in the key manage-
ment block.
Classic security usually addresses the “us versus
them” problem by trying to prevent eavesdropping
on the communication between two boxes that are
known to be secure. Recently, however, copyright
protection has become an important new cryptog-
raphy application that complicates the problem
because it gives keys to everyone. Both attackers
and legitimate customers receive keys because there
is no way to distinguish between the two. Thus,
how sensitive a box is to reverse engineering
becomes an important issue. 
As Figure 2 shows, a public key system requires
a cryptographic handshake at the link level, which
tends to cause the secret keys to bubble to the sur-
face, near the link-level code. This exposes two
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When Beale Screamer broke the Windows Media
Player (http://cryptome.org/ms-drm.htm), this self-
named hacker ridiculed the classic public-key-based
module-to-module interface that Microsoft de-
signed into the product. Beale Screamer said that
while the interface was expensive in performance
and code size, it provided no obstacle to his attack.
In contrast, a broadcast encryption scheme can hide
the secrets—the device keys—much deeper in the
software, near the point of content consumption.
One limitation of broadcast encryption is that it
can never provide a nonrefutable digital signature.
The nonrefutable property makes it difficult for
someone to deny having produced a given digital
signature. Public key cryptography offers an advan-
tage because a forger faces an intractable mathe-
matical problem when attempting to generate a
valid signature without access to the actual signer’s
private key. On the other hand, anybody can ver-
ify a digital signature because doing so doesn’t
require access to secret information. 
A broadcast encryption system replaces the dig-
ital signature with a weaker concept: a message
authentication code. To verify a MAC, devices must
know a shared secret—in this case, the manage-
ment key. Every device that can process the key
management block knows the management key,
not just the device that generated the MAC.
Another advantage of public key cryptography
is that the system design does not require a central
authority. This is not possible in broadcast encryp-
tion, which requires a licensing agency to produce
the key management blocks and assign the device
keys. Many public key systems do use a central
authority, called a certiﬁcate authority, but some
do not. For example, the Pretty Good Privacy sys-
tem
6uses a completely democratic approach. Users
create their own certiﬁcates, which move through-
out the system as users exchange them. To estab-
lish trust, users vouch for other users’ certiﬁcates.
Given the tradeoffs between the two approaches,
broadcast encryption is not the optimal choice for
all applications. Content protection, however, is
well suited to this technology. All of broadcast
encryption’s advantages are important in content
protection, which is primarily oriented toward con-
sumer electronics devices, where features such as
low overhead, an implicit revocation list, and
strong resistance to reverse engineering are essen-
tial considerations.
On the other hand, broadcast encryption’s dis-
advantages, such as nonrefutable signatures, are
irrelevant in content protection. A device cares only
about connecting to another compliant device, not
exactly which device it connects to. Calculating a
correct MAC proves to another device that the
original device is compliant. After all, if a device
misbehaves, it will be excluded in future key man-
agement blocks. Finally, the need for a central
licensing authority is a plus in content protection
systems, which fundamentally focus on licensing,
not technology.
CONTENT PROTECTION 
IN A HOME NETWORK
Most observers agree that home networking is
inevitable: Soon, a family’s personal computer, tele-
vision, stereo, DVD player, and similar devices will
all be connected to each other. These devices could
also be seamlessly connected to the Internet, offer-
ing the advantage of an added content source.
Internet access also provides this application’s
greatest threat, however, at least from the enter-
tainment companies’ viewpoint.
If allowed to run unchecked, a single purchased
movie could be replayed on literally millions of tele-
visions worldwide, generating no income for the
title’s owners beyond the initial sale. All three of
the technologies we describe give consumers com-
plete freedom to enjoy purchased content within
the home, but they raise obstacles to the wide redis-
tribution of protected content outside of it.
By its very name, broadcast encryption implies
a one-to-many technology that’s poorly suited to
peer-to-peer applications. Yet broadcast encryption
can work surprisingly well in a P2P situation, as
long as MACs sufﬁce in place of digital signatures.
To support this assertion with examples, we con-
sider three different approaches to the problem of
protecting entertainment content within a home
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network. The ﬁrst two use conventional pub-
lic key cryptography. The third, the xCP clus-
ter protocol, uses broadcast encryption.
DTCP: Security for the digital bus
Digital Transmission Content Protection
(http://www.dtcp.com/), the most developed
of the three technologies, has been around
for several years and can be found in several
types of consumer devices. The DTCP pro-
tocol provides authentication and data
encryption for devices connected with a dig-
ital bus—primarily the IEEE 1394 Firewire
bus. The 5C companies—Hitachi, Intel,
Matsushita, Sony, and Toshiba—developed DTCP,
which allows the digital connection of consumer
electronic devices such as DVD players, digital tele-
visions, or set-top boxes.
DTCP provides a straightforward application of
state-of-the-art public key cryptography to the
problem of content protection on a digital bus. It
deﬁnes two handshake protocols that let the par-
ticipating devices authenticate each other and
establish a shared session key. Both of these authen-
tication and key exchange protocols are based on
elliptic curve certiﬁcates that follow the new Digital
Signature Algorithm standard and a Difﬁe-Hellman
key exchange.
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The full authentication process requires both
devices to exchange and check the signature on
each other’s certiﬁcates. Next, the Difﬁe-Hellman
key exchange results in the calculation of a session
key. Protected content will not ﬂow between two
devices in the home network unless both are bona
fide, unrevoked, licensed entities that can be
counted on to obey the content protection rules.
Depending on the type of content, the devices might
agree on the restricted authentication protocol.
This process allows devices with limited resources
to participate in the protocol and establish a secure
channel using a shared-secret algorithm.
Unlike other public key approaches, DTCP has a
well-thought-out revocation scheme that uses sys-
tem renewability messages to identify revoked
devices by listing their certiﬁcate numbers. The
licensing agency distributes these messages in new
devices, in  broadcast channels, or on prerecorded
media. 
A link-level technology, DTCP has potential
reverse-engineering exposure. Although DTCP
offers the restricted authentication protocol to
address the overhead of public key cryptography,
this is little better than a shared-secret scheme. The
well-reported DTCP break was not a break at all,
just an exposé that revealed the restricted authen-
tication’s relative weakness.
DTCP does not completely address the problem
of redistributing protected content in a home net-
work application. It offers no technology to protect
the content once it leaves the link and resides on
hard disks within the network. The transient DTCP
session key lives only during the conversation
between two devices. To be fair to DTCP’s design-
ers, they never intended for it to protect media. They
envisioned that some other technology—perhaps
the broadcast-encryption-based CPRM—would
actually protect the content on media.
OCCAM: End-to-end content security
Open Conditional Content Access Management
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offers a more general approach to content security.
An open standard proposed by Cisco Systems,
OCCAM protects content during transmission over
public networks, in home networks, and while
stored on removable or ﬁxed media. 
Cisco bases OCCAM on a hierarchical public
key infrastructure with a central authority, the
OCCAM Certiﬁcation and Revocation Authority.
OCRA assigns device IDs and private keys to device
manufacturers and maintains a database of the cor-
responding public key certiﬁcates, which it distrib-
utes periodically to content owners along with the
revocation information. 
To access a piece of content, the OCCAM-certi-
ﬁed device must request a ticket from the content
owner. Among other things, the ticket contains an
encryption of the content key using the device’s
public key. Only that device can use the ticket to
decrypt and access the content. Doing so requires
connecting the device to the ticket-issuing agency,
at least at the beginning of the transaction. This
connected model lets the content provider check
the device’s revocation status and other restrictions,
such as regional coding or time-based usage con-
straints, before returning an authorization ticket to
the device.
An OCCAM-certiﬁed device provides only lim-
ited support for operating in a disconnected envi-
ronment. Although the standard includes the
predownload of authorization tickets for later play-
back, this feature essentially consists of a connected
system that requires devices to go online to retrieve
an authorization ticket for each piece of content.
OCCAM makes no apologies for being a pure
public key system, thus it offers no shortcuts for
reducing device overhead. Given the connectivity
requirement, it has excellent revocation properties.
The content remains encrypted with the same key
Broadcast
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outside the 
home network.throughout the system until the moment of render-
ing, solving the problem of protecting the content on
network storage. For the same reason, OCCAM
offers the same degree of reverse-engineering pro-
tection as a broadcast encryption scheme. 
The concerns about OCCAM focus on the prac-
ticality of the high connectivity it requires. Every
piece of content the user acquires needs a separate
ticket for each device that accesses it. Although
some analysts have suggested giving consumers a
single ticket for multiple content pieces, such as
“HBO programs for the month of September,”
these proposals have not been convincing. The key
weakness of these simpliﬁcations is that the ticket
becomes an important shared secret, with all the
weaknesses that implies.
Consumer privacy concerns, however, may be
OCCAM’s most troublesome aspect. Even if man-
ufacturers make a conscious effort to disassociate
device certificates from things like device serial
numbers—which would revert to warranty cards—
the home network application will still need to
identify the cluster of devices in a single home. A
list of device manufacturers and model numbers
would probably be sufﬁcient to identify the indi-
vidual. Adding to that a list of purchased content
items—which the ticketing agency would main-
tain—would uniquely identify the user. 
xCP cluster protocol
IBM developed the xCP cluster protocol—a
broadcast encryption-based technology—as part
of its participation in the 4C group.
Figure 3 shows an xCP cluster in which the
devices have agreed upon a common key manage-
ment block. All the protected content is encrypted
with keys based on the management key. The com-
pliant devices only process content associated with
the cluster they belong to. A device joins a cluster
and proves its compliance by verifying the MAC
for the join request based on the cluster’s manage-
ment key. The existing devices in the cluster allow
the new device to join because they know that a cir-
cumvention device could not calculate the correct
MAC. 
A device doesn’t need to converse with other
devices to calculate the content keys. As long as it
can ﬁnd the key management block—which is a
simple ﬁle in the network, a duplicate of which
might even be in the device’s local persistent stor-
age—the device can decrypt any piece of content in
the network. The usage rules may forbid the device
from doing certain things with the cryptographi-
cally protected content. A compliant device will not
perform a forbidden action. For example, a recorder
would not record content marked do not copy. 
Intuitively, the DTCP approach sounds stronger
than xCP, but in cryptographic terms, the two
approaches are equivalent. In DTCP, a source
device like a DVD player would not send content
marked do not copy to a device that a device cer-
tiﬁcate identiﬁes as a recorder. In xCP, the recorder
can access and decrypt the content, but it volun-
tarily chooses not to record it. A DTCP circum-
vention device will never identify itself as a
recorder, even if it is one. Thus, the revocation list
is the only guarantee that a source is not sending
content to a recorder. Likewise, when an xCP
source encrypts content marked do not copy with
the management key, it has the same guarantee: No
compliant recorder will record that content. If a
recording device has keys that do not play by the
rules, the keys will be revoked.
Compared to the roar of cryptographic conver-
sations that fly about the network when DTCP
establishes session keys or when OCCAM issues
tickets, xCP clusters seem almost silent. In xCP, a
cryptographic conversation occurs only when a
device joins the cluster. As must be expected when
comparing xCP to the two public-key-based sys-
tems, this broadcast encryption technology excels
as the low-overhead approach. More surprisingly,
xCP seems to have two functional advantages as
well. Compared to DTCP, xCP protects not just the
link in the home, but also the content on the media
itself. Compared to OCCAM, xCP offers an
unconnected, high-privacy approach.
WHERE BROADCAST ENCRYPTION FAILS
Unfortunately, broadcast encryption falls short
of being a panacea. In at least a couple of instances,
broadcast encryption fails to convincingly address
the full application. 
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Electronic funds transfer
In this application, broadcast encryption
suffers because it lacks a nonrefutable sig-
nature. In public key cryptography, the sig-
nature not only provides validity, it uniquely
identiﬁes the signer. When a client transfers
funds, both the sender and receiver want to
be confident that they are communicating
with the proper entity. 
In broadcast encryption, the MAC only
proves that it was “signed” by a member in
good standing of the approved devices club.
This capability is not totally useless, how-
ever—one club bylaw might be that members are
not allowed to lie about their identity. Liars would
be excluded from further participation in the sys-
tem by revoking their keys in the system’s key man-
agement blocks. 
Although it is possible to use broadcast encryp-
tion for electronic fund transfers, it is impractical.
By the time the miscreant can be identified, the
damage has been done. An attacker can play by the
rules while preparing for the big score. When ready,
the intruder can use a false identify to execute a
one-time attack and then never participate in the
system again. Among other things, it is impossible
to determine which device keys an intruder used
unless the fraud is performed systematically and
repeatedly. In that case, the only way to reveal the
attacker’s identity is by sending a series of “foren-
sic” key management blocks. 
Why don’t these problems occur in the content
protection application? Why couldn’t a hit-and-run
circumvention device break the content protection
rules and remain undetected? Athough such a device
could exist, it would be of no economic consequence
because a low level of unauthorized copying will
always occur, regardless of the technologies used to
guard against it. If millions of such devices circu-
late, the rare successful intrusions would become
obvious, and access for that class of devices could be
revoked. Simply put, content protection schemes
that do not rely on global secrets allow no oppor-
tunity for a single big score.
Thus, a successful broadcast encryption system
requires a way to avoid the big-score phenomenon.
This requirement suggests that a micropayment sys-
tem based on broadcast encryption, which charges
fractions of a cent for minor events like reading a
Web page, is reasonable. The inherent anonymity
of a broadcast-encryption-based system might actu-
ally be an advantage when simulating cash. At the
very least, such a system would be better than one
based on a shared secret.
Secure socket layer
Another common application of public key cryp-
tography involves providing link-level security for
communication channels. Secure socket layer tech-
nology offers a good example of this category.
Many businesses use SSL to provide encryption,
authentication, and integrity-veriﬁcation services
for a variety of application-level Internet protocols.
The best-known implementation of this concept is
the SSL-secured version of HTTP supported by all
standard Web browsers as the HTTPS protocol.
While SSL supports two-way authentication, it is
primarily used in a one-way mode that lets the
browser use an X.509 certiﬁcate issued for the
server’s DNS name to authenticate the Web server.
This lets the browser make sure it has connected to
the site the user asked for, and it provides a way to
establish a session key that protects the conversation.
For renewability, SSL relies on X.509 certiﬁcate
revocation lists. Although most Web browsers
properly process revocation information, there is
no strict requirement for the presence of current
certificate revocation data and no well-defined
automated process for the browser to download
certiﬁcate revocation lists from the issuing certiﬁ-
cate authority. Renewability does not seem to be
an issue for SSL in the server authentication mode. 
In a system that provides server authentication
and communication-channel security with broad-
cast encryption, the server applications need to
obtain a unique set of device keys, and the client
applications need to obtain and periodically update
key management blocks. The client sends its key
management block to the server when it connects,
and the server proves its compliance by using the
management key to encrypt a response. This
response might contain the server’s domain name
and a proposed session key. Unlike an SSL client
that can operate completely without a revocation
list, the system requires the key management block
initialization at least once to set up the client. After
completing that step, the same considerations apply
for updating key management blocks as for down-
loading certiﬁcate revocation list updates.
Clearly, this system is more lightweight than a
conventional SSL-based server system—in terms of
both the communication ﬂow required during the
initial handshake and the CPU requirements for
clients and servers. For commerce servers, the SSL
overhead usually dwarfs all other processing that
the site does.
The problems with this setup resemble those that
beset the electronic funds transfer application. A
server would have a license obligation to use its set
A successful 
broadcast
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phenomenon.of device keys for its site only, but there is no cryp-
tographic enforcement of that obligation. Any
server with a set of device keys could lie about its
identity and masquerade as another site.
Arguably, on the Internet, an imposter would
have to make repeated intrusions to get a big
enough payback to justify the attack. However,
repeated intrusions can be detected, and new key
management blocks can be issued to exclude the
imposter.
More insidious and more difﬁcult to detect is a
silent, man-in-the-middle attacker who has a set
of device keys. Such an attacker can read all the
trafﬁc to the legitimate site and could, for exam-
ple, collect credit card numbers as users send them
to a merchandising site like Amazon.com.
At ﬁrst glance, this vulnerability makes the use
of broadcast encryption for communication-chan-
nel security seem inappropriate. For some applica-
tions, a reduced level of authentication is acceptable
or even preferable—especially if they only issue
device keys based on well-deﬁned criteria, such as
existing certiﬁcation systems or customer-feedback
ratings. We believe that this approach raises the
barrier of entry for potential attackers consider-
ably, and it would provide a meaningful level of
authentication and conﬁdentiality for consumers.
For example, a customer ordering medication over
the Internet is more interested in knowing that a
registered pharmacy operates the server than in
knowing the Web site’s name. 
B
roadcast encryption provides just as much
protection as public key cryptography. How-
ever, broadcast encryption’s cryptographic
guarantee differs fundamentally from the protec-
tion that public key cryptography offers. Broadcast
encryption guarantees a participant that another
participant belongs to the same group. Public key
cryptography guarantees the other participant’s
actual identity. It is not clear that knowing the
actual identity is better than knowing whether that
individual belongs to a particular group. In both
cases, the guarantees are only as strong as the
encompassing system’s functional revocation mech-
anism.
The increased worldwide interest in individual
privacy will motivate developers to rethink many
existing applications. In any event, developers cur-
rently underutilize broadcast encryption as a cryp-
tographic tool, and we believe that this decade will
likely see an increased emphasis on this method of
content protection.  
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